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CASES NOTED

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION BENEFITS RECOVERABLE
ON THE EXISTENCE OF A QUASI CONTRACT
Great Lakes Chemical Co. maintained its home office in Arkansas.
Its truck, loaded with cylinders of methyl bromide, was involved in an
accident in Florida as a result of which the deadly gas began to escape.
Louis Tipper, an expert in the handling of deadly gases, was asked by
the local police chief to help in the clean-up operation. After taking part
in the operation, claimant noticed he had chemical burns on his feet. He
was subsequently hospitalized for over three weeks and totally disabled
for four months. Tipper instituted a claim for workmen's compensation
against Great Lakes Chemical Co. The Judge of Industrial Claims
ruled that the chief of police had the authority to engage Tipper on behalf of Great Lakes Chemical Co. and that an implied contract of employment existed between Tipper and Great Lakes Chemical Co. On review, the Industrial Relations Commission reversed. The Supreme Court
of Florida, on certiorari review, held, reversed: There was an implied
contract of employment between Tipper and the company for workmen's
compensation purposes. Tipper v. Great Lakes Chemical Co., 281 So. 2d
10 (Fla. 1973).
Workmen's compensation claims are governed by Florida Statutes,
section 440 (1971). To qualify for benefits it is essential that one can be an
employee under a contract, either express or implied.1 Tipper is the first
case in Florida to find an employer-employee relationship under a contract implied in law, a "quasi contract."2
The Supreme Court of Florida has usually applied a liberal construction to the workmen's compensation statute3 because "the workmen's compensation law was intended to provide a direct, informal and inexpensive
method of relieving society of the burden of caring for injured workmen
and to place the responsibility on the industry served."' Indeed, the act
itself provides for such a broad interpretation.5
1. "Employee" means
ment or contract of hire
aliens, and also including
§ 440.02(2)(a) (1971).
2. A concise statement

every person engaged in any employment under any appointor apprenticeship, express or implied, oral or written, including
minors whether lawfully or unlawfully employed. FLA. STAT.
of the principle of quasi contracts is found in the Restatement of

Restitution.
A person who without mistake, coercion or request has unconditionally conferred a
benefit upon another is not entitled to restitution, except where the benefit was

conferred under circumstances making such action necessary for the protection of
the interest of the other person or of third persons.
112 (1937).
3. See Thomas Smith Farms, Inc. v. Alday, 182 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 1966); City of Hialeah
v. Warner, 128 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1961); Cook v. Georgia Grocery, Inc., 125 So. 2d 837 (Fla.
1960); Alexander v. Peoples Ice Co., 85 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 1955); Townsley v. Miami Roofing
and Sheet Metal Co., 79 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 1955).
4. Port Everglades Terminal Co. v. Canty, 120 So. 2d 596, 602 (Fla. 1960).
5. In any proceeding for the enforcement of a claim for compensation under this
chapter it shall be presumed, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary:
RESTATEmENT OF THE LAW OF REsTrrToN §

(1) That the claim comes within the provisions of this chapter. (2) That sufficient
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The court has generally held that the test of an employer-employee
relationship should be the same as that which existed at common law for
finding vicarious liability." At common law there were four basic elements
which were considered in determining whether such a relationship existed;
selection and engagement of the services, payment of wages, power of
dismissal, and power of control.7 The cases have agreed that the most
important of these elements is the right to control the conduct of the employee.8
The scope of the Florida workmen's compensation statute is, in one
respect, narrower than the common law definition of an "employee." The
statute requires the existence of an express or implied employment contract.' This was emphasized in Leon County v. Sauls,'° which stated that
if one is to recover under the workmen's compensation statute "there must
exist a contractual relationship between employer and employee grounded
on consideration passing from one to another."" In Sauls the claimant,
whose husband was killed while assisting a police officer in the apprehension of a suspect, was denied recovery because the "deceased had no contractual relationship with the county."' 2
The first workmen's compensation case in Florida which found an
implied contract for hire was Stuyvesant Corp. v. Waterhouse. 8 Although
the court held that such a contract existed, it was one implied in fact, not
in law. 4 The court stated:
There is no doubt that the compensation act contemplates that
it would be necessary in many instances to determine the employer-employee relationship from facts and circumstances as
distinguished from formal contract of employment because of
the use of the word 'implied' in the act itself.'
notice of such claim has been given. (3) That the injury was not occasioned primarily by the intoxication of the injured employee. (4) That the injury was not occasioned by the wilful intention of the injured employee to injure or kill himself or
another.
FLA. STAT. § 440.26 (1971).
6. See, e.g., Gentile Bros. Co. v. Florida Indus. Comm., 10 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 1942).
7. 53 AM. JuR. 2d Master and Servant § 2 (1970).
8. See, e.g., Goldstein v. Gray Decorators, Inc., 166 So. 2d 438 (Fla. 1964); Patton
Seafood Co. v. Glisson, 38 So. 2d 839 (Fla. 1949).
9. FLa. STAT. § 440.02(2)(a) (1971).

10. 151 Fla. 171, 9 So. 2d 461 (1942) [hereinafter referred to as Sauls].
11. Id. at 463.
12. Id.
13. 74 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 1954).
14. Contracts implied in fact are inferred from the facts and circumstances of the
case, and are not formally or explicitly stated in words. It is often said that the
only difference between an express contract and a contract implied in fact is that in
the former the parties arrive at their agreement by words, whether oral or written,
while in the latter their agreement is arrived at by a consideration of their acts and
conduct and that in both of these cases there is, in fact, a contract existing between
the parties, the only difference being in the character of evidence necessary to establish it.
17 AM. JuR. 2d Contract § 3 (1964).
15. Stuyvesant Corp. v. Waterhouse, 74 So. 2d 554, 559 (Fla. 1954).
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The difference between a contract implied in fact and one implied in law
is that the former requires a manifested intent to enter into an agreement
while the latter is an obligation imposed by law on grounds of justice and
equity.
The court in Tipper was forced to look to other jurisdictions for supporting case law dealing with quasi contractual employment in the area of
workmen's compensation. 6 The case relied on by the court in Tipper was
Conveyor's Corp. of America v. Industrial Commission," in which an employee of a certain corporation who went to the rescue of an employee of
a second corporation on neighboring premises, and was himself killed,
was held to be the implied employee of the second corporation. Becker,
an employee of the second corporation, and the only agent of the corporation present, had secured the assistance of the deceased. The court, by
first finding a duty of an employer to aid an employee in an emergency, 8
found that Becker "was by necessary implication authorized to procure
assistance."' 9
The facts in Tipper, made it impossible for the court to squarely rest
its decision on any of the two premises found in Conveyor's. The wellbeing of an employee was not involved, and claimant's assistance was not
secured by an employee of Great Lakes Chemical Co. The Judge of Industrial Claims, in finding for the claimant, based his opinion on the following grounds:
(1) As a police officer, in a public emergency, [the chief of police] had the authority to engage the claimant on behalf of the
employer; (2) from the facts, an implied contract of employment was established, which was confirmed the following morning when Mr. Joe Ford of Great Lakes Chemical Co. was advised of services rendered by the claimant and told Mr. Tipper
to see a doctor;2 0 (3) the services rendered by the claimant
were
2
beneficial to the employer and advanced his interests. '
This reasoning was in line with the Conveyor's case. In both decisions a
third party's implied authority to hire was found. Though not dealing
with an employer's duty to rescue his employee, the Judge of Industrial
Claims may have based his conclusion on the common law duty to refrain
from creating an unreasonable risk of harm to others.22
16. See A. LARsoN, LARSON'S WORKMAN'S COMPENsATION LAW, § 47.42(c) (1973) for
somewhat similar cases arising in other jurisdictions.
17. 200 Wis. 512, 228 N.W. 118 (1929) [hereinafter referred to as Conveyor's].
18. Id. at 514, 228 N.W. at 120.
19. For this kind of implied hiring authority to arise there must, of course, be a genuine
emergency, ruling out normal procedure for hiring or for obtaining permission to engage
assistance. A. LARsoN, LARsoN's WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 47.42(c) (1973).
20. Mr. Ford, employed as a saftey man with Great Lakes Chemical Co. expressed concern over Tipper's exposure to the toxic gas and suggested that he "see a doctor." 281 So. 2d
at 12 (explanation added).
21.

Id.

22. Banfield v. Addington, 104 Fla. 661, 140 So. 893 (1932).
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Upon review, the Industrial Relations Commission "conceded that
an implied contract of employment was a 'possibility' under certain circumstances, but that the events.., involving the claimant would not support such a conclusion as a matter of law."' 28 The Commission believed
that the chief of police had no authority to hire the claimant for Great
Lakes Chemical Company.24 The Commission also stated "that even if
there were an implied contract of hire, there was no finding that the
claimant was an 'employee' as distinguished from an 'independent contractor'.)25
The Supreme Court of Florida totally disregarded the Commission's
contention that the claimant was an independent contractor. The court
felt it was also unnecessary to decide "whether the chief of police ... had
legal authority to 'hire' the claimant on behalf of Great Lakes. 28 The
court stated that "the important facts of this case concern the claimant's
performance of services for Great Lakes, and not how he was called to
action. 27 The court simply found that the facts of the case gave rise to a
contract of hire implied in law. The court stated:
The claimant was serving the respondent when he risked his life
and health in order to protect the lives and health of others and
to restrict the liability of the respondent from further damages
from the accident. A contract of employment, implied in law,
and the claimant is now entitled to
arose out of this performance
28
workmen's compensation.
The supreme court further stated that "the result which we reach is dictated by the emergency nature of the events."2 The holding in Tipper
may, therefore, be limited to emergency situations.
The court in Tipper by this decision has reasserted the proposition
that the workmen's compensation statute should be liberally construed.
The only weakness in the decision is that the court totally disregarded the
Commission's contention that claimant was an independent contractor.
Recovery in past cases has often been denied on this basis. 80 Whether recovery in situations similar to the present case might be denied if the court
finds a claimant to be an independant contractor must be answered by
future decisions of the Supreme Court of Florida. In the future the court
might not concern itself with distinctions of this type by letting the burden for compensation rest where it should, on the industry served.
DAVID FRISCH
23. 281 So. 2d at 12.
24. The Commission seems to have arrived at this decision simply because there was
no decisional, statutory or textual authority to support such a conclusion. Id.
25. Id. See RESTATFMENT (SEcoND) op AGEscy § 220(2) (1958).
26. 281 So. 2d at 14.
27. Id.

28. Id. at 15.
29. Id. at 14.
30. See, e.g., Strickland v. Al Landers Dump Trucks, Inc., 170 So. 2d 445 (Fla. 1964);
Baya's Bar & Grill v. Alcorn, 40 So. 2d 468 (1949).

